Abstract
I. Introduction: the European Institutional Framework
The advent of the European monetary union, now called Euroland, accelerated following the Maastricht treaty (December 1991 . Competitiveness, the degree of openness, the industrial and trade structures, even the unemployment rate, are among these notorious heterogeneous components. They may therefore necessitate the implementation of differentiated domestic policies.
Monetary policy in the Euroland is however "unique" and assigned to a nominal target. The European common monetary policy is implemented by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), made up of the very centralised European Central Bank (ECB) and domestic central banks of the Euroland. Its main objective is "to ensure price stability" (Maastricht tr., art. 105). The ECB and domestic central banks are independent from national governments as well as from the European Commission (EC) 2 (Maastricht tr., art. 107). It follows that central banks cannot monetise public debt, and buy or sell Treasury bills or bonds (Maastricht tr., art. 104). In contrast, fiscal policies are still in the hands of national governments − fiscal federalism or coinsurance 3 have not yet been improved − and their sole instrument for coordination is comprised into the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) which only consist in the preparation by the EC of non binding recommendations on economic policy and economic reforms, adopted by the ECOFIN Council 4 .
Coordination of fiscal policies among EU countries has been reinforced by the creation of the Eurogroup (ECOFIN Council, October 1997) . This institution, nonetheless, has no binding power: it has to improve the exchange of informations between countries regarding their economic overall situation; it has to monitor these situations and their incidence on public finances; finally, it has to control for the evolution of labor market reforms. This informal-type of coordination seems 1 The rationale for "convergence criteria" is dealt with, for instance, in Gros & Thygesen (1992) .
2
The Commission is independent from the member states of the EU; its prerogatives are to represent the common interest of EU countries, to make propositions to the Council (which embodies the representation of national governments), and to implement the decisions which are taken by the Council.
